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Zhao, Enrico H. Gerding Sarvapali D. Ramchurn Dengji; Jennings, Nicholas R.
Balanced Trade Reduction for Dual-Role Exchange Markets Proceedings Article
In: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference, 2015.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Electric Vehicles, Energy, Game Theory, mechanism design, Ridesharing
@inproceedings{zhao:etal:2015,
title = {Balanced Trade Reduction for Dual-Role Exchange Markets},
author = {Enrico H. Gerding Sarvapali D. Ramchurn Dengji Zhao and Nicholas R. Jennings},
url = {http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/372050/},
year = {2015},
date = {2015-01-25},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the AAAI Conference},
abstract = {We consider dual-role exchange markets, where traders can offer to both buy and sell the same commodity in the exchange but, if they transact, they can only be either a buyer or a seller, which is determined by the market mechanism. To design desirable mechanisms for such exchanges, we show that existing solutions may not be incentive compatible, and more importantly, cause the market maker to suffer a significant deficit. Hence, to combat this problem, following McAfee’s trade reduc- tion approach, we propose a new trade reduction mech- anism, called balanced trade reduction, that is incen- tive compatible and also provides flexible trade-offs be- tween efficiency and deficit.},
keywords = {Electric Vehicles, Energy, Game Theory, mechanism design, Ridesharing},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}
Zhao, Enrico H. Gerding Sarvapali D. Ramchurn Dengji; Jennings, Nicholas R.
Balanced Trade Reduction for Dual-Role Exchange Markets Proceedings Article
In: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference, 2015.
@inproceedings{zhao:etal:2015,
title = {Balanced Trade Reduction for Dual-Role Exchange Markets},
author = {Enrico H. Gerding Sarvapali D. Ramchurn Dengji Zhao and Nicholas R. Jennings},
url = {http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/372050/},
year = {2015},
date = {2015-01-25},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the AAAI Conference},
abstract = {We consider dual-role exchange markets, where traders can offer to both buy and sell the same commodity in the exchange but, if they transact, they can only be either a buyer or a seller, which is determined by the market mechanism. To design desirable mechanisms for such exchanges, we show that existing solutions may not be incentive compatible, and more importantly, cause the market maker to suffer a significant deficit. Hence, to combat this problem, following McAfee’s trade reduc- tion approach, we propose a new trade reduction mech- anism, called balanced trade reduction, that is incen- tive compatible and also provides flexible trade-offs be- tween efficiency and deficit.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}
Zhao, Enrico H. Gerding Sarvapali D. Ramchurn Dengji; Jennings, Nicholas R.
Balanced Trade Reduction for Dual-Role Exchange Markets Proceedings Article
In: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference, 2015.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Electric Vehicles, Energy, Game Theory, mechanism design, Ridesharing
@inproceedings{zhao:etal:2015,
title = {Balanced Trade Reduction for Dual-Role Exchange Markets},
author = {Enrico H. Gerding Sarvapali D. Ramchurn Dengji Zhao and Nicholas R. Jennings},
url = {http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/372050/},
year = {2015},
date = {2015-01-25},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the AAAI Conference},
abstract = {We consider dual-role exchange markets, where traders can offer to both buy and sell the same commodity in the exchange but, if they transact, they can only be either a buyer or a seller, which is determined by the market mechanism. To design desirable mechanisms for such exchanges, we show that existing solutions may not be incentive compatible, and more importantly, cause the market maker to suffer a significant deficit. Hence, to combat this problem, following McAfee’s trade reduc- tion approach, we propose a new trade reduction mech- anism, called balanced trade reduction, that is incen- tive compatible and also provides flexible trade-offs be- tween efficiency and deficit.},
keywords = {Electric Vehicles, Energy, Game Theory, mechanism design, Ridesharing},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}
Zhao, Enrico H. Gerding Sarvapali D. Ramchurn Dengji; Jennings, Nicholas R.
Balanced Trade Reduction for Dual-Role Exchange Markets Proceedings Article
In: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference, 2015.
@inproceedings{zhao:etal:2015,
title = {Balanced Trade Reduction for Dual-Role Exchange Markets},
author = {Enrico H. Gerding Sarvapali D. Ramchurn Dengji Zhao and Nicholas R. Jennings},
url = {http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/372050/},
year = {2015},
date = {2015-01-25},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the AAAI Conference},
abstract = {We consider dual-role exchange markets, where traders can offer to both buy and sell the same commodity in the exchange but, if they transact, they can only be either a buyer or a seller, which is determined by the market mechanism. To design desirable mechanisms for such exchanges, we show that existing solutions may not be incentive compatible, and more importantly, cause the market maker to suffer a significant deficit. Hence, to combat this problem, following McAfee’s trade reduc- tion approach, we propose a new trade reduction mech- anism, called balanced trade reduction, that is incen- tive compatible and also provides flexible trade-offs be- tween efficiency and deficit.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}
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Zhao, Enrico H. Gerding Sarvapali D. Ramchurn Dengji; Jennings, Nicholas R.
Balanced Trade Reduction for Dual-Role Exchange Markets Proceedings Article
In: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference, 2015.
@inproceedings{zhao:etal:2015,
title = {Balanced Trade Reduction for Dual-Role Exchange Markets},
author = {Enrico H. Gerding Sarvapali D. Ramchurn Dengji Zhao and Nicholas R. Jennings},
url = {http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/372050/},
year = {2015},
date = {2015-01-25},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the AAAI Conference},
abstract = {We consider dual-role exchange markets, where traders can offer to both buy and sell the same commodity in the exchange but, if they transact, they can only be either a buyer or a seller, which is determined by the market mechanism. To design desirable mechanisms for such exchanges, we show that existing solutions may not be incentive compatible, and more importantly, cause the market maker to suffer a significant deficit. Hence, to combat this problem, following McAfee’s trade reduc- tion approach, we propose a new trade reduction mech- anism, called balanced trade reduction, that is incen- tive compatible and also provides flexible trade-offs be- tween efficiency and deficit.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}